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Assembling (non)knowledge: Security, law, and surveillance in a digital 
world 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Critical analyses of security have focused on the production of knowledge, techniques and 
devices that tame unknowns and render social problems actionable. Drawing on insights from 
Science and Technology Studies and the emerging interdisciplinary field of ‘ignorance 
studies’, this article proposes to explore the enactment of non-knowledge in security and legal 
assemblages. Starting with legal challenges brought against the NSA and other intelligence 
agencies after the Snowden revelations about mass surveillance, it shows how different modes 
of non-knowledge are enacted and not just ‘tamed’: uncertainty, ignorance, secrecy, ambiguity, 
and error. The enactment of non-knowledge has important implications for how we understand 
security practices, the relation between security and law, and public challenges to mass 
surveillance in a digital world. On the one hand, the enactment of non-knowledge by security 
and legal professionals limits activist and NGO resistance to mass surveillance, when these are 
focused on claims to knowledge, disclosure and transparency. On the other, reassembling non-
knowledge and knowledge differently has generative political effects and opens new 
possibilities for intervention and resistance.  
 
Introduction 
 
On 26 February 2013, a few months before the Snowden revelations, in a case filed by Amnesty 
International and a coalition of NGOs back in 2008 against the NSA collection of telephone 
metadata for intelligence purposes, the US Supreme Court decided that the plaintiffs did not 
have ‘legal standing’ to sue the US government (Clapper v Amnesty International USA 2013a). 
According to the majority opinion, the plaintiffs could not establish legal standing on an 
‘objectively reasonable likelihood standard’, as they did not fulfil the criteria that 
‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact’ (Clapper v Amnesty 
International USA 2013a, 2). Thus, the Supreme Court found that Amnesty’s challenge that 
their communications could be intercepted by the NSA was based on a ‘highly speculative fear’ 
(Clapper v Amnesty International USA 2013a, 11). Drawing on previous judicial decisions, 
the US Supreme Court held that ‘allegations of possible future injury’ are not sufficient to 
ensure standing and the argument by Amnesty International and other international NGOs that 
their communications might be monitored by the NSA was based on a ‘highly speculative chain 
of possibilities’ (Clapper v Amnesty International USA 2013a, 18). The Court also stated, in a 
reinforced negative, that ‘We decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standing 
theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors’ (Clapper v Amnesty 
International USA 2013a, 15 emphasis mine). 
After the Snowden revelations in June 2013, mass surveillance in US has been 
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challenged in an increasing number of legal cases.1 All these cases continued to debate 
questions of knowledge, speculation, likelihood and uncertainty. In the US, case after case was 
dismissed post-Snowden with similar justifications as the US Supreme Court had reached pre-
Snowden: speculation and conjecture. In the most recent case brought again the NSA’s 
upstream internet surveillance in 2015, the District Court of Maryland finds that the plaintiffs’ 
allegations ‘depend on suppositions and speculation, with no basis in fact, about how the NSA 
implements Upstream surveillance’ (Wikimedia et al v NSA 2015b, 17). Even when legal 
standing is accepted, questions of likelihood, speculation and conjecture remain central (ACLU 
v Clapper 2013, 2015, Jewel v NSA 2015, Wikimedia et al v NSA 2015b).  
At first sight, these statements resonate with the literature on law and anticipatory 
security as they appear to reinforce the distinction between law as relying on norms, generality 
and some understanding of linear temporality and future-oriented security as speculative and 
based on uncertainty (e.g. Scheuerman, 1994; Scheuerman, 2006a).  Yet, rather than 
preemptive security practices undoing legal provisions and fundamental rights, it is the rights 
claims by activists and NGOs that are deemed to rely on speculation and conjecture. Courts 
also continued to reiterate their basis in factuality against uncertainty and the NGOs’ 
conjectures both before and after the Snowden revelations. What do these developments post-
Snowden mean for the relation between security, law and knowledge in a digital world?  
This article argues that a key stake in challenges to mass surveillance has been the 
enactment of non-knowledge. Courts, security professionals and activists made claims not only 
about the validity and legitimacy of knowledge (Gros, de Goede, and İşleyen 2017), but also 
about what counts as non-knowledge. I show how NSA representatives and the US government 
often do not argue from the position of knowledge, but exactly from that of non-knowledge. In 
these controversies, non-knowledge is enacted as uncertainty, ignorance, secrecy, ambiguity 
and error, assembled and reassembled to reconfigure attributions and subjects of knowledge 
and non-knowledge.  
Drawing on recent debates on non-knowledge and ignorance in sociology and Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) and the emerging field of ‘ignorance studies’, I propose to 
supplement analyses of knowledge controversies (Whatmore 2009) and  ‘epistemic practices’ 
(Bueger 2015) with practices of and controversies over non-knowledge.  The article is also an 
invitation to critical approaches to security and international political sociology (IPS) to engage 
with the growing literature on agnotology in STS and ignorance studies. Rather than advancing 
an exhaustive taxonomy of non-knowledge, it explores how specific modes of non-knowledge 
have emerged in the controversies over mass surveillance. Reconfiguring these controversies 
in terms of assembling knowledge and non-knowledge has important political implications for 
academic and public interventions against mass surveillance in a digital world. 
My argument will proceed in three stages. The first outlines the main debates around 
non-knowledge and ignorance in order to develop an agnotological approach to legal and 
                                                 
1 The most prominent US legal cases against NSA surveillance have been Klayman v Obama (I and II), Jewel v 
NSA, ACLU v Clapper, First Unitarian Church v NSA, Smith v NSA, Schubert v NSA and, most recently, 
Wikimedia v NSA. A series of legal challenges have been mounted in Europe as well: the most notable decisions 
have been by the European Court of Justice in Schrems v Facebook and by the European Court of Human 
Rights in Zakharov v Russia. ECHR decisions in legal challenges concerning GCHQ surveillance are still 
pending (Big Brother Watch and Others v The United Kingdom, 10 Human Rights Organisations and Others v 
The United Kingdom). Given limits of space, the US legal challenges are the key focus of this paper. 
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security assemblages. The second section explores the enactment of non-knowledge in a series 
of legal cases contesting mass surveillance. A third section shows how knowledge and non-
knowledge are assembled and reassembled in ways that challenge existing attributions of what 
counts as ‘the other side of knowledge’, thus opening possibilities for intervention and 
resistance. A novel understanding of resistance to mass surveillance emerges: one that does not 
exclusively challenge dominant knowledge, but contests the attribution, practices and subjects 
of non-knowledge. In conclusion, I develop a series of implications that the agnotological 
approach proposed here entails for IPS and political controversies over mass surveillance in a 
digital world. 
  
 
Enacting non-knowledge: from epistemology to agnotology  
 
Taming unknowns has been key to critical discussions of security, risk and uncertainty in 
security studies and IPS. In attending to the specificities of law-making processes, 
governmental techniques, expert practices and the production of preemptive and anticipatory 
security knowledge (Adey, Anderson, and Graham 2015, Amoore 2014, Anderson 2010, 
Aradau and van Munster 2011, de Goede 2012, de Goede and de Graaf 2013, Neal 2012, Opitz 
and Tellmann 2015), critical scholars have shown how the orientation to the future challenges 
established modes of legal reasoning. Future-oriented security practices insert radical 
uncertainty at the heart of legal reasoning (Amoore 2008, de Goede and de Graaf 2013, Kessler 
2011) and thus highlight key tensions between security and legal knowledge production. 
Radical uncertainty challenges both the aspect of defuturisation – law as creating continuity of 
expectations – and law’s orientation towards the past by inviting law ‘to speculate on deeds 
not yet committed’ (Opitz and Tellmann 2015, 17). Understood as an epistemic practice, law 
is constantly articulated with different modes of knowledge, making it particularly susceptible 
to security matters (Krasmann 2012, 381). Louise Amoore has also argued that exceptional 
measures such as preventive detention or biometrics ‘operate in place of, and in advance of the 
legal thresholds of evidence and decision’ (Amoore 2008, 847).  
Digital technologies have only intensified these tensions between security and law, as 
the future orientation of digital data – devoid from attention to real people and places – sets 
these practices in stark contrast with the past orientation of law. The ‘ontology of association’ 
characteristic of the security derivative is firmly placed in the realm of imagination and 
breaking away from the past-orientation of legal evidence (Amoore 2011, 2). Similarly, 
transactional data turns knowledge about past behaviour into a ‘form of actionable 
intelligence’, which enables ‘the preemption of what could be terrorist schemes or attacks’ 
(Amoore and de Goede 2008, 178 italics in original). These analyses of anticipatory knowledge 
have shed light on the fragility of legal knowledge, which is increasingly ‘undone’ by digital 
technologies and future-oriented security practices. 
 Understanding law and security as practices of knowledge production has focused 
critical debates on the contestation, translation and potentially ‘colonization’ of law by other 
forms of knowledge (Valverde 2003, 15). I propose to supplement these analyses by exploring 
non-knowledge in legal and security assemblages, or what I call – following Robert Proctor’s 
coinage – an agnotological approach. As this section shows, an agnotological approach attends 
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to how security practices do not just tame but also enact unknowns. Moreover, enacting non-
knowledge is neither limited to uncertainty, nor singular to security professionals. The next 
section will develop a close reading of legal cases challenging mass surveillance to show how 
law and security are enacting and assembling knowledge and non-knowledge. 
Over the past decade, there has been a growing interest in ignorance and non-
knowledge in Sociology, Science and Technology Studies (STS) and the emerging field of 
‘ignorance studies’ (Gross and McGoey 2015). Despite productive intersections between STS, 
critical approaches to security and IPS, these have not extended  to the body of work on 
agnotology. Ulrich Beck’s own vocabulary of non-knowledge has gone unnoticed until very 
recently in favour of his theorisation of ‘risk society’ (for an exception see Kessler 2010, Gross 
2016). This is possibly due to the fact that Beck turned to non-knowledge relatively late in his 
career (Gross 2016) and that non-knowledge is a rare usage in English. Although the Oxford 
English Dictionary (2003) traces the use of non-knowledge to the Rolls of Parliament in 1503, 
the word has not gained wide circulation in comparison with ignorance. The study of non-
knowledge also appears, to some extent, counterintuitive and explains the preference for the 
terminology of ignorance. For Beck (2009, 123), non-knowledge can be ‘conscious or 
unconscious, concrete or theoretical, it can signify wilful ignorance or an inability-to-know’. 
It is, however, the inability-to-know or the ‘unknown unknowns’ that have become mostly 
associated with non-knowledge in Beck’s work and subsequent debates, echoing Rumsfeld’s 
(in)famous matrix. For instance, Gross argues that ‘non-knowledge or ignorance can be 
referred to as a realm that escapes recognition’ (Gross 2010, 60, see also Daase and Kessler 
2007). In security studies, Rumsfeld’s matrix of non-knowledge has been mostly used to render 
the forms that international dangers and risks can take (Rasmussen 2006, Daase and Kessler 
2007, Aradau and van Munster 2011). Thus, there has been less attention to how non-
knowledge is enacted in the practices of security governance.  
 The STS literature has focused exactly on the enactment of ignorance and non-
knowledge in scientific knowledge practices. Proctor’s coinage of ‘agnotology’ aimed to 
capture the study of ‘the conscious, unconscious, and structural production of ignorance, its 
diverse causes and conformations, whether brought about by neglect, forgetfulness, myopia, 
extinction, secrecy, or suppression’ (Proctor 2008, 3). Rather than representing ignorance as 
the absence of knowledge or the ‘unknown unknowns’ of a complex and unpredictable world, 
agnotology approaches ignorance as socially constructed, positive and generative of political 
effects. Agnotological studies have explored the mobilisation and deployment of ignorance 
within public controversies about scientific knowledge, from Proctor’s (2011) work on the 
tobacco industry, Oreskes and Conway’s (2011) analysis of the production of ‘doubt’ about 
climate change science and Mirowski’s (2013) diagnosis of the failure of critiques of 
neoliberalism. For instance, Mirowski has argued that ‘the deployment of agnotology is a major 
hallmark of the neoliberal thought collective’, and that it has been a key strategy for unmaking 
calls for reform in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis by ‘filling the public sphere with fog’ 
(2013: 442). Similarly, Oreskes and Conway  trace the production of doubt through the creation 
of public controversies that ‘take uncertainties out of context and leave the impression that 
everything is unresolved’ (2011: 53 italics in original). However, the literature on agnotology 
has often tended to emphasise individual actors and networks of state-academic-market actors. 
Mirowski and Nik-Khah clarify the remit of agnotology as the ‘focused study of the intentional 
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manufacture of doubt and uncertainty in the general populace for specific political motives’ 
(2013, 281) rather than the more general study of socially constructed ignorance. Thus, many 
of the empirical studies have focused mostly on the systemic and deliberate manufacture of 
ignorance (Pinto 2015: 295). 
Feminist work on ‘epistemologies of ignorance’ has moved beyond the realm of 
scientific knowledge production and the intersection between business and science to 
understand how variegated practices of power/ignorance limit the capacity of groups and 
individuals to exercise political agency. Nancy Tuana has enjoined feminist scholars to 
‘understand the practices that account for not knowing, that is, for our lack of knowledge about 
a phenomenon or, in some cases, an account of the practices that resulted in a group unlearning 
what was once a realm of knowledge’ (2004: 195 italics in original). Similarly to the 
agnotological approach proposed by Proctor, epistemologies of ignorance see ignorance as 
positive, a social enactment and not ‘mere absence of knowledge, not as a void but as a force 
all its own which often blocks knowledge, stands in its place, and tacitly or more explicitly 
affirms a need or a commitment not to know’ (Code 2014, 154). The power of ignorance is 
entwined with the production of credible and incredible knowers, as well as with the 
reproduction of relations of (epistemic) domination. Mobilising Charles Mills’ (1997) analysis 
of ‘white ignorance’, feminist scholars have shown how a racial and gendered ‘contract of 
ignorance’ both insulates the dominant from the knowledge about the world they have created, 
and reproduces epistemic injustice and epistemically disadvantaged subjects.  
More recently, the emerging interdisciplinary field of ‘ignorance studies’ has proposed 
to bring together these different approaches in order to theorise ignorance as ‘a regular feature 
of decision-making in general, in social interactions and in everyday communication’ (Gross 
and McGoey 2015, 23). Thus, ignorance rather than non-knowledge has become the 
overarching term for broader, interdisciplinary agnotological analyses. The terminology of 
ignorance is problematic to some extent as it carries negative assumptions; Beck and his 
students prefer to use the coinage of Nichtwissen in German (usually translated as ‘non-
knowledge’ in English). Even as ignorance is understood as a ‘stratified object with multiple 
levels and layers’ (Caduff 2015, 38), agnotology has paid less attention to how ignorance is 
differentiated and contested in relation with other modes of non-knowledge. Mirowski’s (2013) 
use of ignorance in the neoliberalism debates becomes largely equivalent to uncertainty or fog.  
In Oreskes and Conway’s (2011) work on climate change, the production of doubt is equated 
with confusion, ignorance and uncertainty. Even when scholars have proposed taxonomies of 
ignorance, which attend to differences between risk, uncertainty, vagueness, ambiguity, error 
and so, these taxonomies have been limited (Gross 2010, Smithson 2008). I argue that the very 
use of ‘ignorance’ as an overarching term risks limiting attention to how different modes of 
non-knowledge are enacted and how controversies emerge over what counts as knowledge and 
non-knowledge. It is perhaps telling that Rumsfeld’s matrix of known knowns, unknown 
unknowns and unknown knowns obscures considerations of secrecy or error in security 
practices.  
The agnotological approach I propose here takes the enactment of and controversies 
over different modes of non-knowledge as its starting analytical point. In similar ways in which 
STS have suggested that science generates non-knowledge, I analyse law and security as 
assemblages generative of non-knowledge and controversies over what counts as knowledge 
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and non-knowledge.2 Or, as Beck and Wehling ask in a recent text, ‘How is non-knowing 
becoming a topic of political controversies and a political resource, and what different 
dynamics of a politics of non-knowing may be observed?’ (2012, 51).3 I do not aim to develop 
an exhaustive taxonomy or definition of non-knowledge, but to explore how non-knowledge 
is enacted, how heterogeneous modes of non-knowledge become the object of controversies, 
and have political effects. The vocabularies of non-knowledge mobilised in public 
controversies –  from risk and uncertainty to ambiguity, error, surprise, complexity, confusion, 
omission, fallacy or contingency – are more complex and varied than existing taxonomies have 
captured so far. Exploring the ‘dynamic connections’ (Gross 2007) between modes of non-
knowledge and the assembling of knowledge and non-knowledge can offer renewed resources 
for critique and political intervention. The next section turns to the enactment of non-
knowledge in legal cases brought by NGOs and activists before US courts in the wake of the 
Snowden revelations. How do security professionals, legal professionals, NGOs and other 
experts enact different modes of non-knowledge, how do they contest attributions of 
knowledge and non-knowledge, and with what effects for political action?  
  
‘In the twilight of probability’: non-knowledge between law and security 
 
In December 2013, just a few months after the Snowden revelations and after the US Supreme 
Court dismissed the Amnesty International case against the US government, Judge Pauley III 
dismisses the first post-Snowden case filed by the American Civil Liberties Union in June 2013 
(ACLU v Clapper 2013). Although the judge acknowledges that the plaintiffs have acquired 
knowledge about NSA metadata surveillance through the Snowden revelations, his decision 
highlights the persistent problem of non-knowledge:  
 
Fear that telephony metadata relating to the ACLU will be queried or reviewed or 
further investigated ‘relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities.’ Amnesty Int'l, 
133 S. Ct. at 1148. ‘[S]uch a fear is insufficient to create standing,’ Amnesty Int'l, 133 
S. Ct. at 1152. Neither can it establish a violation of an individual’s First Amendment 
rights. (ACLU v Clapper 2013, 47)  
 
Judge Pauley’s reasoning relies on the US Supreme Court decision in Clapper v Amnesty 
International, preceding the Snowden revelations, that the plaintiffs could ‘present no concrete 
evidence to substantiate their fears, but instead rest on mere conjecture about possible 
governmental actions’ (Clapper v Amnesty International USA 2013a, 21). Conjecture 
delegitimises the NGOs’ constitutional claims before the law. This reasoning is repeated across 
courts in the US and it concerns both metadata collection and ‘upstream’ surveillance through 
data capture at internet ‘backbone’ networks. In the most recent US case against mass 
                                                 
2 I use assemblage here in Paul Rabinow’s sense of an ‘experimental matrix of heterogeneous elements, 
techniques and concepts’ (2003, 56). 
3 In his later work on world risk society, Ulrich Beck problematizes the concept of non-knowledge. Particularly 
in the collaborative work with Wehling, non-knowledge becomes central as they see the ‘co-production of 
knowledge and non-knowledge’ as central to our societies (Beck and Wehling 2012, 45). The move to non-
knowledge is very different from Beck’s earlier statements about politicians who do not know but feign 
knowledge. 
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surveillance, the US government has argued that the plaintiffs’ arguments are ‘remarkably 
similar’ to the ones in Amnesty International (Wikimedia et al v NSA 2015a, 44). 
Yet, the earlier decision in Clapper v Amnesty International has an interesting split (5-
4) and a dissenting opinion, written by Justice Breyer, which is underpinned by a different 
understanding of law’s knowledge and non-knowledge. While the 5-4 split has often been read 
along ideological lines of republican versus democrat, Sheila Jasanoff’s analysis of divergences 
between Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer in US Supreme Court decisions shows that Breyer’s 
decisions draw on ‘expert accounts of reality’, while Scalia sees the law as the ‘unambiguous 
baseline on which reason is built; the law prescribes who can speak, who can challenge, and, 
in contested cases, whose reason prevails’ (Jasanoff 2011, 330). Given Breyer’s view of the 
relation between law and expert knowledge and his long-standing interest in risk regulation 
and uncertainty, his dissent in Clapper v Amnesty International can be read as a different 
understanding of the relation between law and (non)knowledge. For Breyer, law is entwined 
with uncertainty and it is mobilised in the ‘game’ of knowing and not-knowing. Breyer thus 
holds that the likelihood of the plaintiffs having their communications intercepted in the future 
is not speculative, but a reasonable inference:  
 
The future is inherently uncertain. Yet federal courts frequently entertain actions for 
injunctions and for declaratory relief aimed at preventing future activities that are 
reasonably likely or highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place.  And that 
degree of certainty is all that is needed to support standing here (Clapper v Amnesty 
International USA 2013b, 10 Breyer, J, dissenting, my italics). 
 
Drawing on an analogy with everyday reasoning about risk and likelihood, Breyer presents an 
understanding of law as being able to address future events: 
 
One can, of course, always imagine some special circumstance that negates a virtual 
likelihood, no matter how strong.  But the same is true about most, if not all, ordinary 
inferences about future events.  Perhaps, despite pouring rain, the streets will remain 
dry (due to the presence of a special chemical). But ordinarily a party that seeks to 
defeat a strong natural inference must bear the burden of showing that some such 
special circumstance exists. […] Consequently, we need only assume that the 
Government is doing its job (to find out about, and combat, terrorism) in order to 
conclude that there is a high probability that the Government will intercept at least some 
electronic communication to which at least some of the plaintiffs are parties. 4 (Clapper 
v Amnesty International USA 2013b, 10 Breyer, J, dissenting)  
 
Justice Breyer’s reference to a ‘degree of certainty’ echoes the understanding of uncertainty in 
law going back to the seventeenth century. Uncertainty and certainty are not mutually exclusive 
in legal reasoning, but are intimately entwined through probabilistic reasoning. As Ian Hacking 
(Hacking 1975, 86) reminds us, ‘[p]robability is not new to law’. Yet, it is not mathematical 
probability, usually associated with statistical risk techniques in the IR literature, that has been 
                                                 
4 Breyer is the author of several books and articles on risk and regulation (e.g. Breyer 1993). 
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central to legal reasoning, but epistemic probability. Ian Hacking has succinctly summarised 
this dual nature of probability: statistical probability is concerned with ‘stochastic laws of 
chance processes’, while epistemological probability gauges ‘reasonable degrees of belief in 
propositions quite devoid of statistical background’ (1975, 12). It is probability in this latter 
sense of ‘degrees of certainty’ that has long shaped legal reasoning, evidence and proof.  
Courts make decisions based on less than certain evidence. However, these decisions 
have to be produced as reasonable. As Barbara Shapiro’s seminal work on the history of law 
and probability has shown, the emergence of ideas of moral certainty, degrees of certainty, and 
the reasonable man were integral to the shift from ‘the traditional philosophical norm of the 
demonstrably certain toward a more probabilistic view of human knowledge and natural 
science’ (Shapiro 1983, 15). She draws on John Locke’s reading of epistemic probabilities as 
key to law and decisions on evidence to show that, in the absence of certainty, judgements were 
made on the basis of probability. For Locke, the degrees of certainty in our knowledge span a 
continuum ‘from the very neighbourhood of certainty and demonstration, quite down to 
improbability and unlikeness, even to the confines of impossibility; and also degrees of assent 
from full assurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust' (Locke 2004 
[1689], 800). Conjecture was at the lower end of Locke’s continuum of probabilities, not far 
from ignorance, but it was also deemed able to be transformed into probabilistic judgement. 
Therefore, invocations of conjecture and speculation need to be situated within these debates 
that did not oppose certainty and uncertainty, but aimed to draw a line between different modes 
of acceptable and unacceptable uncertainty.  
Thus, law meshes certainty and uncertainty through the calibration of epistemic 
probabilities. Even when mathematical or statistical probability came to demarcate natural 
science from law, for instance, epistemic probabilities have continued to shape legal reasoning, 
which ‘has been modified since [Locke] only in particulars’ (Shapiro 1983, 193). The use of 
different standards of reasonableness means that law reasons ‘in the twilight of probability’ 
(Locke 2004 [1689]).5 When courts dismiss the NGOs’ claims as conjecture, they effectively 
rely on a long history of legal reasoning where conjecture is at the lower end of Locke’s 
continuum of uncertainty. Nonetheless, this history of legal reasoning is simultaneously 
rendered unknown, as discourses of scientific method have instituted a strong distinction 
between factual certainty and conjectural or speculative uncertainty in legal reasoning.6  
 Ultimately, I suggest reading these cases as controversies over non-knowledge and not 
just knowledge. Conjecture and speculation name unacceptable degrees of uncertainty and are 
therefore relegated to the realm of non-knowledge. In the latest response to the decision to 
dismiss the Wikimedia et al v NSA case, the plaintiffs argue that their arguments are represented 
as relying on probabilities and therefore speculation, thus undermining the acceptability of 
‘deduction, reasonable inference, and expert opinion’ in legal cases to establish knowledge 
claims (Wikimedia et al v NSA 2016). However, by asserting a strong distinction between 
certain facts and uncertain probabilities, the plaintiffs inadvertently adopt a similar position to 
that of Justice Scalia and Judge Pauley in previous cases.  
                                                 
5 Compare the interpretation of reasonable as the ordinary ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ by Didier Bigo and 
Elspeth Guild (2007). 
6 Even as scientists have started to challenge this strong distinction, it is operative in many social fields. 
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This distinction is also adopted by security professionals, thus reinforcing the relegation 
of NGOs’ claims to a zone of non-knowledge. For instance, in a testimony before the court in 
ACLU v Clapper, James Clapper, former Director of National Intelligence, invokes the earlier 
Supreme Court decision to argue that the plaintiffs still do not have standing as they cannot 
show ‘injury in fact’: 
 
The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that the mere fact that the government 
may have obtained information associated with plaintiffs’ telephone calls does not 
demonstrate standing where, as here, plaintiff’ allegations are premised on a theory of 
‘subjective chill’ arising from a speculative fear that the government might ‘in the 
future take some other and additional action detrimental to them with that information’ 
(Clapper et al. 2014, 24). 
 
The opposition of factuality and certainty on the one hand and speculation and uncertainty on 
the other is only possible to the extent that the probabilistic language of law – ‘probable cause’ 
or even ‘reasonable suspicion’ – is recast in the language of scientific method.  
Yet, the assembling of fact and certainty on one side against uncertainty and probability 
on the other does not mean that all uncertainty is ascribed to a zone of non-knowledge. The 
vocabulary of likelihood and reasonableness is deployed by security professionals to 
characterise their own knowledge production when they point out that, for instance, the ‘NSA 
may target under this certification [section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] 
non-United States persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States who 
possess, are expected to receive, and/or are likely to communicate foreign intelligence 
information’ (Ledgett 2007, 3). Here, security professionals sever reasonableness and 
factuality by adopting a probabilistic language of legal standards, which calibrates uncertainty 
and certainty but does not see them as mutually exclusive. The language of probabilities and 
reasonableness allows security professionals to manage uncertainty and calibrate the ‘degrees 
of certainty’ in their own production of knowledge. Thus, when NSA analysts are required to 
show that they have ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ before querying a database, the legal 
standard is operationalised as low probability rather than high probability.7 The differential 
enactment of uncertainty across legal and security practices remains, however, unquestioned.  
Even conjectures and speculations become acceptable when they emerge in the process 
of producing security knowledge. In ACLU v Clapper, the NGOs’ ‘speculative’ claims are 
deemed unacceptable, while the NSA’s ability to produce speculative knowledge appears 
credible. The ‘highly attenuated chain of possibilities’ that Judge Pauley dismissed in the 
ACLU argumentation is deemed indubitable when deployed by the NSA:  
 
No doubt, the bulk telephony metadata collection program vacuums up information 
about virtually every telephone call to, from, or within the United States. That is 
by design, as it allows the NSA to detect relationships so attenuated and ephemeral 
they would otherwise escape notice. (ACLU v Clapper 2013, 52 my italics)  
                                                 
7 For one of the most detailed discussion of the ‘reasonable’ standards used by the NSA as part of the so-called 
‘minimization’ procedures, see the report by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (2014b). 
 10 
 
NSA’s ‘attenuated and ephemeral relations’ become ascriptions of knowledge in contrast to 
the ‘highly attenuated chain of possibilities’ that the plaintiffs allegedly mesh in a zone of non-
knowledge. The contention that metadata can reveal potential terrorists in the future is not 
evaluated by the same standards as the NGOs’ claims. By virtue of being speculative, the 
processing of metadata appears as ‘eminently reasonable’: 
 
It is eminently reasonable to believe that Section 215 bulk telephony metadata is 
relevant to counter-terrorism investigations. The government queries the telephony 
metadata to identify connections between suspected-terrorist selectors and their 
unknown contacts. JA 272. Bulk collection of telephony metadata makes it possible to 
draw those historical connections because there is no way to know in advance which 
metadata will be responsive to queries for those in contact with suspected-terrorist 
selectors (Clapper et al 2014: 32).  
 
Conjectures are justified in the NSA actions, while being disqualified in the plaintiffs’ claims. 
For the security professionals, conjecture is cast as the beginning of a journey towards 
knowledge, a mode of reducible uncertainty; for the NGOs, conjecture is the end of the road, 
an unsurpassable limit of irreducible uncertainty. This dual enactment of conjecture as 
reducible and irreducible uncertainty is made possible through the temporalisation of 
knowledge production as a process moving from uncertainty and conjecture to certainty and 
facts. The NSA’s conjectures about ‘what might be connected’ appear both necessary and 
reducible in the process of knowledge generation, while the NGOs’ conjectures remain 
irreducible. Given the dominance of the imaginaries of scientific method, this rendering of 
knowledge production is not challenged by NGOs. Rather, they attempt to establish their 
claims as factual and certain. This is in stark contrast to the security professionals, who do not 
only claim conjecture as reducible knowledge, but also make claims to non-knowledge, 
showing that non-knowledge and knowledge are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, the 
NSA argues that metadata is supposed to connect ‘fragmented and fleeting communications’ 
on the path to know; on the other, the NSA also claims non-knowledge as it only collects 
information up to three hops and does not know the identity of the phone subscribers (ACLU 
v Clapper 2013, 52, 41). Security professionals simultaneously mobilise the language of 
knowledge and non-knowledge and thus limit challenges against mass surveillance.  
This discussion of the differential enactment of conjecture and speculation shows how 
difficult it has been to challenge practices of mass surveillance, even when different spaces of 
political controversy have been opened (see also Gros, de Goede, and İşleyen 2017). Breyer 
has formulated one such challenge, which nonetheless failed to capture the entanglement of 
uncertainty and certainty through probabilistic reasoning. While this is partly due to the 
dominance of imaginaries about the scientific method in law and security, the next section will 
show how non-knowledge has also been reassembled in challenges against mass surveillance. 
 
Reassembling non-knowledge in public controversies 
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If the deployment of uncertainty in legal and security reasoning has largely limited anti-
surveillance actions, other modes of non-knowledge have made possible practices of 
reassembling that have challenged mass surveillance: secrecy, ignorance, ambiguity and error. 
In the fragile assemblage of knowledge and non-knowledge, secrecy, ignorance, ambiguity and 
error could be assembled differently. This section does not aim to offer an exhaustive analysis 
of the modes of non-knowledge enacted in the controversies over mass surveillance. For 
reasons of space, it will offer a set of illustrations of how reassembling non-knowledge has 
made possible political contestations of surveillance.  
The arguments about speculation and conjecture discussed in the previous section have 
been entangled with questions of secrecy and ignorance. The ‘state secrecy’ argument has been 
pursued by the US government in legal cases concerning bulk data collection before the 
Snowden revelations. When the argument of state secrecy was challenged after the Snowden 
revelations, the US government engaged in a process of complex classification and 
declassification of documents. In so doing, it rearticulated secrecy through practices of limited 
declassification, thus demarcating areas of access and knowledge from zones of non-
knowledge. As Brian Balmer (2006: 696) has argued, secrecy ‘fractures and disrupts the 
topography of knowledge – providing particular geographically restricted accounts of the 
world’. Secrecy creates a spatial-epistemic regime, which separates spaces of knowledge and 
knowers from spaces of non-knowledge. The secret as boundary drawing does not just enact 
the status of those in the secret as credible knowers and producers of knowledge – it also 
delegitimizes the credibility of those who are not part of the community of secrets. As a tool 
of ‘group formation’, of ‘control and the establishment of hierarchies’ (Vermeir and Margocsy 
2012: 162), secrecy enacts the boundary between knowing and not-knowing as inside/outside.  
Therefore, what is at stake in the production of secrecy is not simply the removal of 
knowledge, the creation of ‘blacked-out’ spaces, or the drawing of boundaries through the 
multiplication of categories of classified documents, but equally the crediting or discrediting 
of subjects of knowledge. When articulated in relation to secrecy, the differentiation of 
reducible and irreducible uncertainty becomes starker, as NGOs and civil rights activists lack 
access to the laboratories of security. As Judge T.S. Ellis puts it in Wikimedia v NSA (2015b, 
27), ‘in a case like this, plaintiffs necessarily rely on probabilities and speculation because most 
facts about Upstream surveillance remain classified, and hence plaintiffs see through a glass 
darkly’. Here, secrecy, ignorance and uncertainty are mobilised in conjunction, so that the lack 
of access to the laboratories of security becomes read as ignorance inevitably leading to 
speculation and conjecture. At first sight, the assembling of secrecy and conjecture re-enacts 
the boundary between those who know and those who do not and deactivates anti-surveillance 
claims. Through the legal challenges mounted in various US courts, NSA representatives, 
experts and government lawyers have repeatedly argued from the position of non-knowledge. 
They have shifted attention from what has become publicly known about mass surveillance to 
the limits of public knowledge, to what we ignore about the specific operations of the 
programmes given the continued secrecy of classified information (e.g. Wikimedia et al v NSA 
2015a).  
Yet, secrecy, uncertainty and ignorance can also be assembled differently, as the US 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did in ACLU v Clapper on 7 May 2015, under a month 
before the Patriot Act was due to expire. The Court reassembled non-knowledge to invalidate 
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the Congress support for Section 215 of the Patriot Act by arguing that ‘Congress cannot 
reasonably be said to have ratified a program of which many members of Congress – and all 
members of the public – were not aware’ (ACLU v Clapper 2015). Only a limited number of 
members of Congress had an understanding of the telephone metadata programme and most 
did not know whether the FISC interpretation of Section 215 of the Patriot Act was correct. 
The Court inserts a new subject of non-knowledge in the debate – neither security 
professionals, nor NGOs, but members of Congress. In so doing, the Court enacts members of 
Congress as ignorant due to the unjustified use of accelerated procedures and secrecy. The 
telephone metadata programme was ‘shrouded in the secrecy applicable to classified 
information’ (ACLU v Clapper 2015, 81). Given the secrecy around the provisions of the 
Patriot Act and ignorance of members of Congress about what metadata collection entailed, 
their assent to the bulk metadata programme is suspended as their knowledge is revealed as 
non-knowledge.  
By enacting ignorance and new subjects of non-knowledge – members of Congress – 
the Court reassembles knowledge and non-knowledge in ways that avoid direct challenges 
either to secrecy or to the definition of legal standing. It does not broach the question of ‘state 
secrets’, which the US Government had initially raised to stop a range of cases from litigation. 
The state secret privilege had already been partially suspended in other NSA surveillance 
litigation ‘given the multiple public disclosures of information regarding the surveillance 
program’ (Jewel v NSA 2013). At the same time, judges have also accepted that the state 
secrets privilege ‘would apply to bar disclosure of significant materials related to the alleged 
Program’ (Jewel v NSA 2013). In ACLU v Clapper (2015), the Court also continues the 
practice of previous judgements of not challenging the assumptions of conjecture and 
speculation as it defers to Congress to discuss the ‘reasonableness’ of the Government’s 
assertions as to what data is needed for national security. However, by introducing a new mode 
of non-knowledge, it destabilises the existing assemblage. Here, the Court enacts a tactic 
similar to Jacques Rancière’s (1991) ignorant schoolmaster, Joseph Jacotot: Jacotot overturns 
the relation between the master supposed to know and the supposedly ignorant students by 
teaching what he does not know. Similarly, the Court inverts the logic of security professionals 
supposed to know and the NGOs’ irreducible uncertainty not by claiming better or more valid 
knowledge but by inserting a different mode and subject of non-knowledge: the ignorance of 
members of Congress. 
Alongside ignorance and secrecy, ambiguity has also been deployed both to foster non-
knowledge and to (de)stabilise the assembling of ignorance, uncertainty and secrecy. 
Ambiguity has been often invoked in conjunction with uncertainty to justify the intelligence 
agencies’ secrecy: ‘to create in the minds of potential malefactors significant ambiguity and 
uncertainty about which channels of communication might be safe and which channels of 
communication are likely to be monitored’ (Home Affairs Committee 2014, Ev 61 by Nigel 
Inskter). In the oral hearing in another anti-surveillance case in the US, Jewel v NSA, Richard 
Wiebe notes for the plaintiffs that ‘we have confronted in this case shifting uses of terms like 
“acquiring”, “collection”, “capturing”, and that’s why we have had divided things into stages’ 
(Jewel v NSA 2014, 54). The production of ambiguity about NSA practices is effectively a 
form of non-knowledge that affects not only malevolent others, but anti-surveillance activists 
and NGOs.  
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Jacqueline Best has distinguished ambiguity from uncertainty, as the former 
‘emphasizes the central role played by interpretation and its effects on our efforts to 
communicate and act’ (Best 2012, 677) and it is fostered as a resource for governing (Best 
2009, 2012). While ambiguity in this sense would be intrinsic to legal interpretation and public 
controversies, ambiguity as enacted by the NSA’s use of terminology produces ‘fog’ about 
surveillance practices and relegates NGOs and activists to a zone of non-knowledge. As 
mentioned earlier, the intelligence agencies have placed particular emphasis on use the 
language of ‘intelligence collection’ or ‘bulk metadata collection’ (Clapper 2013) to avoid 
public criticism of mass surveillance. The ambiguity of ‘collection’ allows both for the 
inclusion of a range of processes – encompassing data analytics – and the refutation of the 
criticism of mass surveillance. In criticising the NGO and activist references to the practices of 
‘mass surveillance’, security professionals in the UK have coined the ambiguous terminology 
of ‘bulk powers’ (Anderson Q.C. 2016). ‘Bulk’ is etymologically associated with commodities 
rather than people and thus eschews connotations of surveillance by humans, drawing on an 
implicit differentiation of data processing by humans and by computers, often invoked in the 
justification of intelligence agencies’ practices (see Aradau and Blanke 2015).  
In its report on the NSA telephone metadata programme, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board (PCLOB) also notes how ambiguity about the practices of data collection is 
enacted: 
 
While the NSA’s upstream collection is intended to acquire Internet communications, 
it does so through the acquisition of Internet transactions. The difference between 
communications and transactions is a significant one, and the government’s failure to 
initially distinguish and account for this distinction caused the FISA court to 
misunderstand the nature of the collection or over two years… (Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board 2014, 39 italics in original) 
 
The ambiguity of ‘communication’/‘transaction’ underpinned the NSA claim that it conducted 
targeted surveillance of foreigners outside the US, who were a legitimate foreign intelligence 
interest. This ambiguity sustained non-knowledge about the inevitable collection of relational 
or transactional data, therefore data that entails more than the target of surveillance.  
Challenging ambiguity, however, cannot be reduced to a call for clarity or precision, as 
ambiguity is intrinsic not only to legal reasoning but to language more generally. The question 
that the PCLOB raises is that the use of ambiguity obfuscates NSA practices and enacts non-
knowledge for subjects in charge of oversight and therefore supposed to know. The PCLOB 
destabilises the assembling of ambiguity, secrecy and ignorance by redrawing the lines 
between subjects of knowledge and subjects of non-knowledge. The ACLU has similarly 
argued that the government has used the ambiguity between ‘collection of data’ and ‘reviewing 
data’ to dismiss the NGOs’ claims as ‘speculative prospect’ and base their standing upon the 
collection of data as seizure (ACLU v Clapper 2015). However, the ACLU’s general claims 
about ambiguity at the expense of relations with other modes of non-knowledge have failed to 
destabilise the assemblage of non-knowledge in similar ways as the PCLOB has done.  
Finally, the legal challenges have perhaps unsurprisingly also raised the problem of 
error. Court judgments are held to have been made in error (Jewel v NSA 2014, Wikimedia et 
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al v NSA 2016). At times, some errors are deemed preferable over others, as the error of 
‘closing the courthouse doors to a plaintiff who suffers an actual injury’ is rendered less 
important than the error of proceeding with litigation that challenges the powers of other 
branches of government (Wikimedia et al v NSA 2015b, 27). This distribution of errors turns 
upside down the distinction between the most serious judicial error of convicting an innocent 
person and the less serious judicial error of not convicting a guilty one. Relations between 
branches of government are elevated above the constitutional rights of citizens. Errors are also 
the result of non-knowledge in a digital world – unlike the NSA experts, NGOs are deemed to 
make errors in their claims given their lack of knowledge about the Internet and NSA 
programmes. However, when the NSA’s own errors are brought into public view, error also 
destabilises ascriptions of non-knowledge and demarcations between more or less acceptable 
errors. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board raised the production of error as a 
central element of oversight and reporting for the NSA (Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board 2014). Introducing oversight over the production of errors in NSA’s data collection, 
review and reporting, the PCLOB also reconfigures the zones of knowledge and non-
knowledge.  
The agnotological analysis developed here has shown that enacting non-knowledge and 
(re)assembling uncertainty, ignorance, secrecy, uncertainty, ambiguity or error become key 
stakes in these public controversies over mass surveillance. Moreover, it is the reassembling of 
non-knowledge that opens new possibilities for contesting mass surveillance. Even though 
reassembling non-knowledge has opened new possibilities for resistance, so far NGOs and 
anti-surveillance activists have only marginally mobilised non-knowledge and have continued 
to largely focus on the production of knowledge about NSA surveillance, practices of data 
collection and data analytics. I suggest that resistance to surveillance practices needs to 
intervene through reassembling non-knowledge, however counterintuitive such a political 
move might appear at first sight. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Critical research in security studies and IPS has offered detailed analyses of heterogeneous 
assemblages that are deployed in governing insecurity and risk. They have highlighted regimes 
of power/knowledge, networks of expertise and discursive-material entanglements. Drawing 
on STS and the emerging interdisciplinary field of ‘ignorance studies’, this article has proposed 
to supplement analyses of knowledge assemblages and epistemic practices with practices of 
and controversies over the enactment of non-knowledge. Although a rich literature has 
emerged at the intersection of STS and IPS, there has been scant attention to the growing body 
of work on agnotology.  
The analysis developed here is an invitation to IPS and critical approaches to security 
to attend to the enactment of non-knowledge and not just knowledge, to supplement regimes 
of power/knowledge with power/non-knowledge, and knowledge controversies with non-
knowledge controversies. While contributions to IPS have highlighted the ‘blindspots’ of 
ambiguity (Best 2009) and secrecy (Walters and Luscombe 2017), I have argued that we need 
to explore heterogeneous modes of non-knowledge, their entanglements and (re)assembling. 
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Rather than an exhaustive taxonomy of non-knowledge, the agnotological approach I have 
proposed here develops an analysis of non-knowledge as enacted and (re)assembled in public 
controversies. It thus asks for closer attention to the heterogeneity of non-knowledge and its 
political deployment, without subsuming it to a strategic use of ignorance as the literature on 
agnotology has tended to do. 
In taking a series of legal cases as sites of encounter between security professionals, 
judges, lawyers and anti-surveillance activists, I have shown how non-knowledge becomes a 
key political stake in public controversies over mass surveillance. Court opinions and 
judgements, declassified documents by the intelligence community, amici curiae and public 
interventions paint a complex picture of contestation over the enactment of non-knowledge and 
not just knowledge. As security and legal professionals deploy heterogeneous modes of non-
knowledge to justify their practices, we need to understand how attributions of non-knowledge 
emerge, how they are (de)stabilised and what subjects of non-knowledge they foster. In this 
analysis, law and security are not set in opposition, but are understood as assemblages of 
knowledge and non-knowledge. Both security professionals and judges have argued from the 
position of non-knowledge, while NGOs and anti-surveillance activists have tended to focus 
on the production of knowledge. However, through reassembling non-knowledge, I have 
shown that novel possibilities for resistance can emerge – from the recasting of the relation 
between certainty and uncertainty in law to the work of reassembling of ignorance, secrecy, 
ambiguity and error that challenges mass surveillance.  
This somewhat counterintuitive argument about the political relevance of non-
knowledge has important implications for how we understand resistance to mass surveillance. 
Firstly, while this article has largely focused on public controversies in the US, non-knowledge 
has been assembled quite differently in European legal challenges. In the case of Roman 
Zakharov v Russia, the European Court of Human Rights (2015), for instance, has reiterated 
that ‘reasonable likelihood’ was sufficient in cases challenging secret surveillance. In the 
ongoing Schrems v Facebook case about data transfer to the US, the US government has asked 
to be a joint party, thus raising new controversies over non-knowledge (Moody 2016). 
Secondly, I have suggested the resisting mass surveillance entails creative and unexpected 
mobilisations of non-knowledge that challenge the existing work of assembling. Resistance 
cannot mobilise only subjects of knowledge and make claims to disclosure, transparency and 
making visible. It needs to work with and between the tensions and lines of assembling and 
reassembling. Yet, so far NGOs and anti-surveillance activists have only marginally engaged 
with questions of non-knowledge and have tended to mobilise them in order to produce 
certainty, clarity, precision, visibility and transparency. Enacting non-knowledge can have 
destabilising effects even beyond the public controversies I have discussed here. Finn Brunton 
and Helen Nissenbaum have suggested ‘obfuscation’ as an everyday anti-surveillance tactic 
through ‘the production of noise modelled on the existing signal in order to make a collection 
of data more ambiguous, confusing, harder to exploit, more difficult to act on, and therefore 
less valuable’ (Brunton and Nissenbaum 2015, 61). Obfuscation is effectively a device to enact 
uncertainty about ‘leaky’ data. Thirdly, assembling non-knowledge can become particularly 
relevant for politicising digital transformations. We need to develop fine-grained analyses of 
how non-knowledge is enacted through secret algorithms, the opacity of computer processes, 
uncertain data patterns and secret flows.  
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